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In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and with public ﬁrms. The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty re-
duces the propensity of entrepreneurial ﬁr m st oi n n o v a t e ,w h i l ei td o e sn o ta ﬀect the
propensity of public ﬁrms to innovate. Furthermore, it predicts that the negative
eﬀect of uncertainty on innovation is stronger for the less diversiﬁed entrepreneurial
ﬁrms, and is stronger in the absence of ﬁnancing frictions in the economy. In the
second part of the paper I test these predictions on a dataset of small and medium
Italian manufacturing ﬁrms.
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1Introduction
This paper studies the eﬀect of undiversiﬁable entrepreneurial risk on innovation. En-
trepreneurs have traditionally been considered an engine of innovation and technological
progress for the economy. More recently economists have begun to recognize that the
behaviour of entrepreneurial households is important for aggregate economic ﬂuctuations
because these households account for a substantial share of aggregate investment, pro-
duction and savings. This paper is motivated by two facts, which have been emphasized
in this recent literature. First, entrepreneurial households appear to be poorly diversi-
ﬁed. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) analyze US data and show that 48% of
all private equity is owned by households for whom it constitutes at least 75% of their
total net worth. Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) provide evidence that
agency considerations play a key role in explaining why entrepreneurs on average hold
large ownership shares. Second, empirical evidence generally ﬁnds entrepreneurs to be as
risk averse, and some studies ﬁnd them to be even more risk averse than non entrepreneurs
(Sarasvathy, Simon and Lave, 1998; Miner and Raju, 2004; Hongwei and Ruef 2004).
The presence of a large amount of undiversiﬁable risk inﬂuences the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and portfolio choices of entrepreneurial households (Heaton and Lucas,
2000). The objective of this paper is to analyze the consequences of this risk for the
willingness of entrepreneurial ﬁrms to undertake risky and innovative projects. The hy-
pothesis is that, because entrepreneurial households have most of their wealth invested in
their own ﬁrm, their main instrument to rebalance the risk/return proﬁle of their assets in
response to a change in uncertainty, is the choice of the riskiness of the ﬁrm’s investment
projects.
I test this hypothesis both theoretically and empirically. I develop a model of a general
2equilibrium entrepreneurial economy. Each entrepreneur is inﬁnitely lived and can invest
in its own business or can borrow or lend at the risk free rate. The business produces out-
put using ﬁxed capital, which is subject to depreciation shocks that generate an exogenous
volatility of proﬁts. The entrepreneur also has the possibility to innovate the technology
of the business by paying a ﬁxed cost. I consider both the case in which the innovation
improves the productivity with probability one, called “technology adoption”, and the
case in which the innovation improves the productivity if successful but it reduces it if
unsuccessful, called “risky innovation”. The idiosyncratic risks of ﬁxed capital investment
and of risky innovation are not insurable.
In the model I also introduce a corporate sector, where the ﬁrms are identical to the
entrepreneurial ﬁrms, except that the investment decisions of the corporate sector ﬁrms
are taken by risk neutral managers. I solve the general equilibrium of the model in the
absence of aggregate uncertainty, but in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty for both
the entrepreneurial ﬁrms and the risk neutral ﬁrms. I simulate the artiﬁcial economy and
calibrate it so that the cross sectional variance of the income/sales ratio and the amount
of undiversiﬁable risk in the simulated entrepreneurial sector matches the same moments
calculated for US entrepreneurial households.
The simulation results determine the following predictions: i) an increase in uncer-
tainty, as measured by the volatility of proﬁts, reduces the propensity of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms to invest in “risky innovation”, while it does not aﬀect the propensity of risk neutral
ﬁrms. This negative eﬀect is found to be quite strong despite the fact that the innovation
shock is uncorrelated with the proﬁts shock. ii) The negative eﬀect of uncertainty on
innovation for entrepreneurial ﬁr m si ss t r o n g e rt h el e s sd i v e r s i ﬁed they are, and the lower
is the presence of ﬁnancing frictions in the economy. iii) A change in uncertainty does
3not aﬀect the investment in “technology adoption” for all ﬁrms.
In the second part of the paper I test these predictions on a dataset of small and
medium Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. This dataset includes detailed information about
the ownership structure of the ﬁrms and the innovation content of ﬁrm investment. The
estimation results are consistent with all the predictions of the model.
This paper is related to Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004), who study the innovation of
owner-led ﬁrms versus managerial ﬁrms. Furthermore, this paper is related to the liter-
ature on undiversiﬁable entrepreneurial risk and entrepreneurial decisions. In particular
Heaton and Lucas (2000) study the implications of entrepreneurial undiversiﬁable risk
for portfolio choices and asset prices. Rampini (2004) and Caggetti and De Nardi (2006)
develop general equilibrium models where ﬁnancing imperfections and undiversiﬁable risk
aﬀect the decision to become an entrepreneur, and illustrate the consequences for aggre-
gate ﬂuctuations and growth. Finally, this paper is related to the literature about general
equilibrium economies with heterogenous entrepreneurial households and incomplete mar-
kets (Quadrini and Meh, 2006; Angeletos, 2006; Covas, 2006, among others).
This paper makes a new contribution to the literature by showing that undiversiﬁable
entrepreneurial risk aﬀects the relationship between uncertainty and innovation. More
speciﬁcally, this paper makes a theoretical contribution by analyzing simultaneously the
investment in ﬁx e dc a p i t a la n di ni n n o v a t i o ni nag e n e r a le q u i l i b r i u me n t r e p r e n e u r i a l
economy with incomplete markets. The simulations of the model show that the negative
eﬀect of uncertainty on innovation is signiﬁcant for realistic levels of undiversiﬁable risk.
Another interesting theoretical ﬁnding is that uncertainty signiﬁcantly aﬀects ﬁxed capital
investment and innovation only for ﬁnancially unconstrained entrepreneurial ﬁrms. This
prediction is conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis in the second part of the paper. It
4implies that the understanding of the uncertainty-innovation relationship can be useful
to disentangle the eﬀects of precautionary behaviour from those of ﬁnancing constraints
on the investment decisions of ﬁrms.
The other major contribution of this paper is that it provides empirical evidence con-
cerning the link between uncertainty and the innovation decisions of entrepreneurial versus
non entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The dataset used is particularly interesting, as it combines bal-
ance sheet data with survey data. The balance sheet data covers a large panel with more
than 10000 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. The survey data covers the same ﬁrms, and it
includes detailed qualitative information about the property structure, about the invest-
ment in innovation, and about other relevant qualitative information that can be used to
control the robustness of the results, such as the presence of ﬁnancing constraints, the
degree of internationalization and the market structure of the ﬁrms.
The outline of this paper is as follows: section I illustrates the model. Section II shows
the results of the simulations of a general equilibrium entrepreneurial economy. Section III
shows the empirical analysis of the Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. Section IV summarizes
the conclusions.
IT h e m o d e l
I consider an economy with a large number of ﬁrms and an identical number of households
that manage them. Firms are all ex ante identical, and have access to a technology that
produces using ﬁxed capital. In addition to investing in ﬁxed capital, ﬁrms can also try
to innovate to improve their technology. Firms are also subject to idiosyncratic shocks,
which cause exogenous ﬂuctuations in proﬁts. The objective of the theoretical section of
this paper is to study how changes in the volatility of the exogenous shocks aﬀect the
5willingness of entrepreneurial ﬁrms to invest in risky innovation.
I nt h em o d e lIa s s u m et h a taf r a c t i o nγ of ﬁrms is managed by entrepreneurial house-
holds. Each of these households can either invest in their own ﬁrm or borrow or lend a
one period riskless bond. I call these households the “entrepreneurial sector”.
Af r a c t i o n( 1 - γ) of ﬁrms is managed by the remaining households. The diﬀerence is
that these households can invest in each other’s projects (but not in the entrepreneurial
sector), and are able to perfectly diversify their risk. I call these households “diversiﬁed”
and the corresponding ﬁrms the “corporate sector”. Without loss of generality I assume
that all diversiﬁed households own the same uniform portfolio in the shares of the ﬁrms in
the corporate sector. These diversiﬁed households can also trade the one period riskless
bond with the entrepreneurial households.
I introduce the “diversiﬁed” households and the “corporate sector” in the model for
two reasons. First, because they allow to simulate an artiﬁcial economy where the de-
gree of concentration of risk of the entrepreneurial households is comparable to the level
observed in reality. If only the entrepreneurial sector were present in the economy, the
entrepreneurial households would not be able to diversify much of their idiosyncratic risk,
and it would be much more diﬃcult to match the empirical data. Conversely the di-
versiﬁed households are willing to sell risk free debt to the entrepreneurs, allowing them
to better diversify their risk. Second, because the comparison of the behaviour of en-
trepreneurial ﬁrms with the behaviour of the corporate sector ﬁrms allows me to isolate
and quantify the eﬀect of entrepreneurial risk on investment and innovation.
As in Abel and Eberly (2005) I assume that the ﬁrms can, by investing a ﬁxed cost,
update their technology to the frontier. In order to preserve the stationarity property of
the maximization problem I assume that the technology frontier is constant. If a ﬁrm
6does not innovate, its technology depreciates with a positive probability and drifts away
from the frontier, because of obsolescence. Below I describe the investment decisions of
the ﬁrms in the entrepreneurial sector and in the corporate sector.
A The entrepreneurial sector




t ;0< α < 1 (1)
where kt is capital and At is the technology level. I introduce in the model an indicator
function It, which is equal to one if the entrepreneur invests in innovation by paying a
ﬁxed cost F, and zero otherwise. If the entrepreneur does not innovate (It =0 )then with
probability φ technology depreciates at the rate δA. The value of φ can be interpreted as
the probability that a competitor of the ﬁrm successfully innovates its technology.1
If the ﬁrm invests in innovation (It =1 ) , it succeeds with probability ξ,a n di t s
technology reaches the frontier A . With probability 1−ξ innovation fails, and technology
reaches the lower bound A. This outcome can be interpreted as the ﬁrm having abandoned
the old technology, which was possibly not cutting edge but moderately successful, to
develop a new technology, which turns out to be unsuccessful and less proﬁtable than
the existing one. The dynamics of technology conditional on innovation are summarized
1The parameter φ is mainly included for technical reasons. A small value of φ allows to calibrate the
model with a relatively small number of discrete states of the technology level At.I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nI
show that such assumption is not essential for the results, which hold also for the case of deterministic
depreciation of technology (φ =1 ) .
7below:
if It =0then:
At+1 =m a x [ A,(1 − δA)At] with probability φ
At with probability 1 − φ
if It =1then: At+1 = A with probability ξ
At+1 =A with probability 1 − ξ
The value of ξ determines two types of innovation. If ξ =1we can interpret the It =1
decision as “technology adoption”. The ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed cost to adopt a new technology
which, with probability one, will allow it to produce more eﬃciently. Instead if ξ < 1 the
It =1decision can be interpreted as “risky innovation”.
The cost of innovation is ﬁxed from the point of view of the entrepreneur, but it is a
function of the expected proﬁts generated by innovation in the steady state:
F = gπ(r) (2)
where g is a constant, r is the return on the one period riskless bond, and π(r) are the
average proﬁts generated in one period after upgrading the technology by a risk neutral
ﬁrm.2
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of time t, the ﬁrm produces
yt and repays the debt bt contracted in the previous period. Net worth is:
wt = yt +( 1− δt)kt − bt (3)
The depreciation rate of capital δt i st h es o u r c eo fe x o g e n o u su n c e r t a i n t yf o rt h eﬁrm. It
follows an i.i.d. symmetric Markow process:
δt = δ + εt (4)
εt = θ(St) with probability 0.5
εt = −θ(St) with probability 0.5
(5)
2Condition (2) ensures that the ﬁxed cost F is always proportional to the expected return from
innovation in the economy.
80 < θ(St) ≤ δ (6)
The volatility regime St will be described below. The variable εt can be interpreted as
a shock on proﬁts. Another way to generate the same eﬀect would be to introduce eεt as a
multiplicative factor in the production function. The advantage of the formulation in (4)-
(6) is that, because ﬁxed capital kt is frictionless, an increase in the volatility of εt increases
the volatility of proﬁts without directly aﬀecting the expected productivity of capital.
On the contrary an increase in a multiplicative technology shock would simultaneously
increase both the volatility of proﬁts and the expected return on capital, because of the
concavity of the production function. This would make it more diﬃcult to isolate the
eﬀect of uncertainty on the investment decisions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms for a given level
of expected productivity.
Finally, equation (6) implies that the volatility of the εt shock is a function of the
regime St, which follows a two state persistent stochastic process:
St ∈ {SH,S L} (7)
prob(St = St−1)=ρ (8)
prob(St 6= St−1)=1− ρ (9)
0.5 < ρ < 1 (10)
θ(SH) > θ(SL) (11)
Condition (11) implies that the volatility of proﬁts is higher in the SH state than in
the SL state. For simplicity, I rule out the presence of aggregate uncertainty by assuming
that the regime St is ﬁrm speciﬁc.
9T h ep u r p o s eo ft h en e x ts e c t i o no ft h i sp a p e ri st os i m u l a t et h em o d e la n dt ov e r i f yh o w
the investment and innovation of entrepreneurial and risk neutral ﬁrms are aﬀected by
the level of exogenous uncertainty. One could argue that the introduction of the switching
regime St is an unnecessary complication, because one could simply solve the model for a
constant θ and then compare the simulation results for diﬀerent values of θ. However such
simpler exercise would compare diﬀerent steady states with diﬀerent characteristics, and
would not be directly comparable to the empirical investigation performed in the second
part of the paper, where I study how uncertainty aﬀects innovation decisions at the ﬁrm
level. For example, the simulations of the model with switching regimes take also into
account the fact that the propensity to save and the wealth of entrepreneurial households
change conditional on the state St.
After producing, the ﬁrm decides the consumption of the household ct,t h el e v e lo f
ﬁxed capital that will be productive in the next period kt+1, the amount to be borrowed
or lent, and wether or not to pay the ﬁxed cost and upgrade the technology. The budget
constraint is the following:
ct = wt +
bt+1
R
− FIt − kt+1 (12)
R ≡ 1+r (13)
bt+1/R is the net present value of the face value of debt bt+1, to be repaid in the next
period. It is subject to the following borrowing constraint:
bt+1 ≤ b + τkt+1 (14)
b ≥ 0;τ ≥ 0 (15)
10Given the presence of incomplete markets, constraint (14) is included in order to avoid
that bt grows unbounded over time. However in the benchmark calibration of the model
I set b and τ large enough so that the investment of the ﬁrm is virtually never ﬁnancially
constrained. I do so for two reasons. First, because the main objective of this paper is
to identify the eﬀect of risk aversion on innovation and to distinguish it from the eﬀects
of other factors such as borrowing constraints. This strategy is feasible from the point
of view of the empirical tests performed in the second part of this paper, because I use
a dataset that contains qualitative information about the ﬁnancing problems faced by
the ﬁrms, and allows to control for the possible eﬀect of borrowing constraints. Second,
in the model ﬁnancing constraints aﬀect entrepreneurial ﬁrms very diﬀerently from the
w a yt h e ya ﬀect risk neutral ﬁrms in the “corporate sector”. A risk neutral ﬁrm that
maximizes proﬁts and faces a tight borrowing constraint may retain all earnings and
quickly accumulate enough ﬁnancial wealth to become unconstrained. An entrepreneurial
ﬁrm that maximizes intertemporal utility cannot pursue the same strategy, because of
consumption smoothing considerations. As a consequence a simulated economy where
borrowing constraints are binding for a non negligible share of ﬁrms makes the comparison
between entrepreneurial ﬁrms and risk neutral ﬁrms very problematic.
The entrepreneurial ﬁrm chooses bt+1,k t+1 and It in order to maximize the value
function (16) subject to constraints (12) and (14):
V (St,w t,A t)=m a x
It,
{V
up (St,w t,A t+1),V
noup (St,w t,A t+1)} (16)
where:
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eEtV (St+1,w t+1,A t+1) | It =0
¾
(18)
11By taking the ﬁrst order condition of (17) and (18) with respect to kt+1 and bt+1 it is
possible to derive, conditional on the upgrade decision, the following ﬁrst order conditions
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UK = R − 1+δ (22)





+1− δt+1,u 0 (ct+1) | It
i
is negative, and it reduces
the optimal amount of capital kt+1. It represents the risk premium induced by risk aversion
with respect to the uncertainty in δt+1 and At+1. The risk of innovation is also reﬂected in
the term {Et [V (St+1,w t+1,A t+1)] | It =1 } in equation (17). The higher is the volatility
of At+1 conditional on innovating, the higher is the variance of future consumption, which
will be very high in case of success but very low in case of failure, the lower is the expected
utility from consumption and the value of {Et [V (St+1,w t+1,A t+1)] | It =1 }.T h i se ﬀect
reduces the incentive to innovate for an entrepreneurial ﬁrm with respect to a risk neutral
ﬁrm, and it will be quantiﬁed in section II.
BT h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r
Firms in this sector are identical to those described above. The only diﬀerence is that


























































Because all ﬁrms are ex ante identical, and each household owns an equally weighted








d (St,A t) (26)
The absence of aggregate uncertainty implies that Γd (St,A t), the density function of
risk neutral ﬁrms, is constant, and therefore also d is constant over time. Therefore the



































Equation (29) states that the diversiﬁed households cannot borrow more than the net
present value of their ﬂow of dividends.
13C General equilibrium
In the following deﬁnitions I use the subscripts i and j to indicate the i−th entrepreneurial
household and the j −th diversiﬁed household respectively. The equilibrium of the econ-
omy is: a value function for the entrepreneurial ﬁrm Vi,t (θi,t,w i,t,A i,t), and for the risk
neutral ﬁrm V d
j,t (Sj,t,A j,t);the policy functions ki,t+1 (Si,t,w i,t,A i,t),b i,t+1 (Si,t,w i,t,A i,t)
and ci,t (Si,t,w i,t,A i,t);t h ed i v e r s i ﬁed households’ borrowing bd and consumption cd;t h e
cross sectional distribution of entrepreneurs’ characteristics Γ(Sj,t,w j,t,A j,t) and the in-
terest rate rt such that:
i) Given rt, the entrepreneur’s policy functions solve the entrepreneur’s decision prob-
lem (16), and the diversiﬁed household policy functions’ solve the diversiﬁed household’s
decision problem (27).
ii) The interest rate r ensures that the bond market is in equilibrium:
γ
Z
bt+1 (Si,t,w i,t,A i,t)dΓ(Si,t,w i,t,A i,t)+( 1− γ)b
d =0 (30)
iii) The cross sectional distribution of entrepreneurs’ characteristics Γ(Si,t,w i,t,A i,t)
and of risk neutral ﬁrms’ characteristics Γd (Sj,t,A j,t) are constant over time.
In order to ensure that in equilibrium entrepreneurial households face a non negligible




When equation (30) holds, the consumption path of the diversiﬁed households is con-
s t a n to v e rt i m e( cd
j,t = cd
j,t+1 = cd ∀j,t), and the equilibrium interest rate is R∗ = 1
βd.
Intuitively, suppose that assumption 1 does not hold, because β
d = β
e, and that R = 1
βd.
F o rt h i sv a l u eo ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h ee n t r e p r e n e u r s ,a sl o n ga st h e yf a c ei d i o s y n c r a t i cr i s k ,
are willing to invest in the risk free bond for precautionary reasons. This reduces R below
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βd, and it incentives the diversiﬁed households to borrow in order to increase consump-
tion. This accumulation of debt by the diversiﬁed households continues until either the
entrepreneurial sector has saved so much that is able to fully diversify the risk, or until
the diversiﬁed households have reached their maximum borrowing allowed by equation
(29). On the contrary assumption 1 ensures that entrepreneurs save up to the point that
their desire to save in order to diversify their risk is counterbalanced by their desire to
consume due to their relatively low discount factor.
II Simulation results
I solve the maximization problem of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and of the risk neutral ﬁrm
using a numerical method (see appendix 1 for details), and I simulate an artiﬁcial economy.







Table I illustrates the choice of benchmark parameters. The expected depreciation rate
of ﬁxed capital δ is set equal to 14.5%. β
d is set to match an average real interest rate of
3%. The fraction γ of entrepreneurial households in the economy is equal to 0.4.3 The
parameters θ(SH), θ(SL), α and β
e are calibrated on annual data of the entrepreneurial
households in the 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 US Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF). The
parameter α determines the curvature of the production function and can be interpreted
a st h ed e g r e eo fm a r k e tp o w e ro ft h eﬁrm. I calibrate it to match the average of the
net proﬁts/sales ratio for the entrepreneurial businesses in the SCF. The parameters
θ(St) and β
e match the degree of concentration of risk of US entrepreneurial households.
3The value of γ does not aﬀect the results as long as it is not too large. If the fraction of diversiﬁed
households 1−γ is to small, constraint (29) may be binding in equilibrium, and it may become impossible
to clear the bond market.
15More speciﬁcally, the average variability of the ε shock
θ(SH)+θ(SL)
2 matches the standard
deviation of the net income/sales ratio for the entrepreneurial businesses in the SCF.4
The diﬀerence between θ(SH) and θ(SL) and ρ, the persistency of the St regime, are
chosen so that the standard deviation of the proﬁts/sales ratio is on average 20% higher
in the high volatility state than in the low volatility state. The parameter β
e matches
the wealth distribution of the entrepreneurial sector. Following Moskowitz and Vissing-
J ø r g e n s e n( 2 0 0 2 )Im e a s u r ei ta st h er a t i ob e t ween the value of the business and the total
n e tw o r t ho ft h eh o u s e h o l d .T h el a r g e rt h er a t i oi s ,t h em o r et h ep r o ﬁts of the business
are an important component of the permanent wealth of the household, the more the
household is sensitive to changes in business risk for its consumption and investment
decisions. I choose β
e in order to match the fraction of total private equity that is owned
by households for which the value of the business constitutes at lease 75% of their total
net worth.5 Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) calculate this fraction to be around
48%. The assumptions of the model establish a direct mapping between this moment and
the value of β
e. If β
e decreases, entrepreneurial households are willing to consume more
and to borrow more, and their distribution of ﬁnancial wealth shifts to the left.
The frontier technology A is normalised to 1. The parameters ξ, δA,Aand φ jointly
determine the frequency and the risk of innovation. In the benchmark calibrations I choose
A=0.61, or 61% of the frontier technology. This value implies that the risk of innovation
accounts for around 30% of the total volatility of proﬁts.6 Moreover I choose ξ in order
4The cross sectional volatility of this ratio is actually equal to 0.18 for these businesses, but such high
value may overestimate the true volatility of proﬁts, as it could also be driven by unobserved heterogeneity
across businesses. Since the higher is the parameter θ the stronger are the ﬁndings of the simulations, I
conservatively choose a value which is half of empirical estimate.
5Given the assumption of incomplete markets, the model does not imply an objective market value
of an entrepreneurial business. Instead I compute it as its certainty equivalence for the entrepreneur.
Nonethless using more objective masures of the value of the business, such as the net present value of
the expected proﬁts, does not aﬀect the results obtained in this section.
6This is calculated as the diﬀerence between the overall volatility of proﬁts and the volatility of proﬁts
conditioal on not choosing to innovate.
16to match the average frequency of innovation observed for the non entrepreneurial ﬁrms
in the sample analyzed in the next section.
Finally, I set φ =0 .05, meaning that technology depreciates on average every 20
periods, and δA is on average equal to 0.057, meaning that depreciation implies a 35% fall
in average proﬁts. Obviously there exist many possible combinations of φ and δA that
imply exactly the same expected depreciation in technology. I chose a relatively small
value of φ for convenience, because it implies a large value of δA and it reduces the number
of discretised points in the space of the state variable At, making the computation of the
several simulated economies presented in the next section more manageable. One problem
with this choice is that, since technology depreciates in discrete intervals, it follows that a




, rather than a single value, is consistent with the matched
moments. However, the speciﬁcv a l u eo fδA may aﬀect the risky innovation choice of





range, and calculate the average eﬀect of uncertainty on risky innovation





. Even though this should not aﬀect the validity of the qualitative
ﬁndings of the simulations, it may make the quantitative ﬁndings (the elasticity of the
probability to innovate with respect to a change in exogenous uncertainty) less precise.
In order to control for this problem, in the next section I compare the benchmark results





The parameter g in equation (2) matches an estimate of the average cost of innovation.
I consider the sample of Italian ﬁrms analyzed in the next section, and I calculate the
cost of labour related to innovation using the information about the fraction of employees
that are engaged in R&D in the ﬁrms. Multiplying this fraction for the total labour cost,
17I calculate that the labour cost of innovation is on average equal to 1.2% of the value of
the ﬁrms assets. Assuming that labour cost is 1/3 of all costs related to innovation, then
g is set so that the ratio of F over total assets is equal to 3.75%.
T h er e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient η is set equal to 2, and the parameters b and τ
that determine the tightness of the collateral constraint (14) are set at a level high enough
so that entrepreneurial ﬁrms are never ﬁnancially constrained. In the following tables I
verify the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent values of these parameters.
Table II illustrates the relationship between capital, innovation and uncertainty in the
simulated economy for the benchmark parameters. The table is divided in two sections.
The “risky innovation” section corresponds to the benchmark parameters illustrated in
table I. The risk of innovation is actually driven by three parameters: the ﬁxed cost of
innovation F, the probability that innovation fails 1 − ξ and the lower bound value of
technology. The smaller is ξ, the longer is the expected time necessary to innovate. While
the ﬁrm keeps trying, it has to pay the ﬁxed cost F and moreover it can only produce with
the low productivity level A. Therefore, conditional on the values of F and A the lower is
ξ, the more costly innovation is, and the longer the ﬁrm uses the current technology and
delays innovation. It follows that the lower is ξ, the larger is the distance between the
current productivity At and A and the larger is the volatility of the permanent income
of an entrepreneurial ﬁrm that decides to innovate.
The “technology adoption” section instead assumes that innovation is successful with
probability one (ξ =1 ) . However innovation is still risky in the sense that once the tech-
nology is upgraded, the ﬁrm will have to invest more in ﬁxed capital, and such investment
is risky because of the stochastic depreciation of capital and technology. In this section
Ic a l i b r a t et h eﬁxed cost F so that the expected cost of upgrading the technology to the
18frontier is the same with respect to the risky innovation case.7 Moreover I change the
value of δA so that the frequency of innovation is approximately the same in both cases.
Under this new parametrization it also follows that the diﬀerence between the frontier
technology A and the value of At at which ﬁrms on average innovate is much smaller than
in the “risky innovation” case. Therefore I also lower the value of A so that ﬁrms on
average innovate for comparable values of At in the two simulations.
For both the “risky innovation” and the “technology adoption” sections I illustrate
the statistics computed for all the observations and the statistics computed conditional
on low volatility of proﬁts (St = SL) and on high volatility of proﬁts (St = SH). The
ﬁrst four rows report the information about the volatility of proﬁts relative to sales. The
“high uncertainty” row refers to a simulation where both the average
θ(SH)+θ(SL)
2 and the
diﬀerence across states θ(SH) − θ(SL) is higher than in the benchmark case.
The next three rows report the information about the return on capital. Notice that the
investment decisions of risk neutral ﬁrms are, by construction, not aﬀected by the amount
of uncertainty, and therefore have identical statistics in the benchmark case and in the high
uncertainty case. However the presence of risk neutral ﬁrms is useful. The comparison
between them and the entrepreneurial ﬁrms allows to precisely measure the eﬀect of risk
aversion and precautionary saving on the investment decisions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
For example the table shows that in the case of “risky innovation” and high uncertainty
the return on capital is on average approximately 6% higher for entrepreneurial ﬁrms than
for risk neutral ﬁrms. As expected, the return on capital is also substantially higher when
St = SH than when St = SL. Regarding the “technology adoption” economy, here return
on capital is on average higher because in this simulated economy ﬁrms do not have to
7The expected cost of upgrading the technology to the frontier is equal to F 1+r
r+ξ.
19experience periods of low productivity while trying to innovate. Another consequence is
that the precautionary saving eﬀect is smaller. For example in the high uncertainty case
the return on capital is on average only 2.7% higher for entrepreneurial ﬁrms than for
risk neutral ﬁr m s .T h en e x tt h r e er o w sr e p o r tt h ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tt h ea v e r a g ea m o u n t
of capital. As expected precautionary saving reduces the investment in ﬁxed capital. For
example in the high uncertainty case capital is 10% lower for entrepreneurial ﬁrms than
for risk neutral ﬁrms.
Finally, the bottom of the table reports the information about innovation. In the case
of risky innovation it is found that entrepreneurial ﬁrms innovate less on average than
risk neutral ﬁrms. Importantly, their innovation decisions are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
the amount of uncertainty. The frequency of risky innovation of entrepreneurial ﬁrms is
4% higher conditional on (St = SL) than conditional on (St = SH) in the benchmark
simulation, and is 8% higher in the simulation with higher uncertainty. These values
correspond to an elasticity of the probability to innovate with respect to the standard
deviation of the proﬁts/sales ratio equal to -0.2. This ﬁnding is perhaps surprising given
that the innovation shock and the background uncertainty (the ε shock) are independent.
However it is consistent with the theoretical ﬁndings of Gollier and Pratt (1996), who
show that under certain conditions risk averse agents are “vulnerable” to risk. Among
other thing “risk vulnerability” implies that “adding an unfair background risk to wealth
makes risk averse individuals behave in a more risk averse way with respect to another
independent risk”.8 As u ﬃcient condition for “risk vulnerability” is decreasing and convex
risk aversion, which is satisﬁed by CARA and CRRA utility functions. This condition is
8Gollier and Pratt (1996) consider risks that are entirely unrelated with each other, while in the
case of my model I have outcomes (the innovation outcome and the depreciation of capital) that are
contemporaneously uncorrelated but are dynamically related, because if innovation is succesful the ﬁrm
invests in more capital and also implicitly increases the magnitude of the future expected depreciation
risk.
20realistic, because it implies that the wealthier an agent is, the smaller is the reduction in
risk premium of a small risk for a given increase in wealth.
Importantly, the level of background risk does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the innovation in
the economy with “technology adoption”. The frequency of innovation is approximately
identical in both the low risk and the high risk states. This result does not depend on the
fact that in this economy the diﬀerence between the frontier technology A and the value
of At at which ﬁrms on average innovate is very small. I simulated alternative economies
with technology adoption where the ﬁxed cost F is so large that the diﬀerence between
the frontier technology A and the value of At for an innovating ﬁr mi st h es a m ea si n
the “risky technology” economy. In this case I found that entrepreneurial ﬁrms innovate
more rather than less than risk neutral ﬁrms, and marginally more in the high risk state
than in the low risk state. This is exactly the opposite of what happens in the “risky
innovation” economy. The reason is that, when ξ =1and innovation is not risky the
ﬁxed cost F is a safe investment, because it generates higher return in the next period
with certainty. Therefore the larger is F in the “technology adoption” economy, the more
innovation becomes desirable for risk averse entrepreneurs.9
Before I argued that a small value of φ is useful because it increases the computa-
tional speed in solving the investment problem. In order to show that the assumption of
stochastic depreciation of At is not necessary to generate the negative eﬀect of uncertainty
on risky innovation, in table III I compare the benchmark simulation with a simulation
where technology depreciates at a deterministic rate (φ =1 ) . In the new simulation the
parameters F,ξ and δA a r ec a l i b r a t e ds ot h a tt h ev a l u eo fAt for an innovating ﬁrm and
the frequency of innovation are approximately the same as in the benchmark case. While
9The simulation results with higher values of F a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
21computationally much more expensive (the state space of At is seven times larger than in




, and it allows me
to check whether this approximation is important for the qualitative results illustrated
in table I. Table III shows that risky innovation is still signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀected
by uncertainty also in the case of deterministic depreciation. Notably, the sensitivity of
innovation to the volatility regime is almost as large as in the benchmark calibration.
Table IV reports the sensitivity of the above results to diﬀerent levels of the relative
risk aversion coeﬃcient η. It shows that, even though the sensitivity of entrepreneurial
risky innovation to uncertainty is higher the more risk averse entrepreneurs are, it is still
present even for low values of risk aversion.
One possible objection concerning the robustness of the negative eﬀect of uncertainty
on risky entrepreneurial innovation is that in the model entrepreneurs are not allowed
to choose less risky businesses. One could then argue that, even though the empirical
evidence shows that on average entrepreneurs are as risk averse as non entrepreneurs, it
may be that high risk businesses are managed by less risk averse individuals, and vice-
versa. In order to control for this factor, the “mixed types” rows in table IV refer to
simulations with heterogenous entrepreneurial types, where less risk averse entrepreneurs
manage high risk businesses, and vice-versa. The simulation results still show a signif-
icant negative eﬀect of uncertainty on entrepreneurial innovation, especially in the high
uncertainty case.
Finally, the bottom part of table IV reports the innovation statistics for less diversiﬁed
and more diversiﬁed entrepreneurs. I deﬁne as diversiﬁed those observations for which
entrepreneurs have accumulated enough ﬁnancial wealth wt so that this constitutes at
least 50% of their total net worth, which is measured as the certainty equivalence value of
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t plus wt. It follows that for these observations the value of the business
is equal or less than 50% of their total net worth. The undiversiﬁed entrepreneurs are the
complementary sample. Their frequency of innovation is on average higher simply because
most of the innovation takes place when the ﬁrm hits the lower bound A and while it tries
to innovate every period it runs down its wealth wt. More interesting is the comparison of
the sensitivity of innovation to uncertainty for diversiﬁed and undiversiﬁed entrepreneurs.
Table IV shows that such sensitivity is always much larger for undiversiﬁed entrepreneurs
than for diversiﬁed ones. The explanation is that wealth accumulation reduces the impor-
tance of the background risk for the consumption decisions of entrepreneurial households,
and thus also reduces the eﬀect of uncertainty on risky innovation. In other words, the
more wealthy a ﬁrm is, the less the idiosyncratic risk of the business matters, the more
the ﬁr mb e h a v e sa sar i s kn e u t r a lﬁrm. This result conﬁrms the intuition that uncertainty
may be an important factor in explaining entrepreneurial innovation decisions not just
because entrepreneurs are risk averse, but also because most of them do not diversify the
idiosyncratic risk of their business.
Less intuitive and more interesting are the results illustrated in table V. Here I com-
pare the benchmark economy with economies where the coeﬃcient τ of the collateral con-
s t r a i n t( 1 4 )i ss u ﬃciently low so that the ﬁxed investment of a fraction of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms is ﬁnancially constrained in equilibrium. The ﬁrst two columns replicate the bench-
mark result, where τ =0 .9 and no ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. The next two columns
consider a value of τ =0 .3, which corresponds to having 25% of ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms. The ﬁnal two columns consider a value of τ =0 , which corresponds to having 50%
of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
As expected, ﬁnancing constraints reduce average capital and increase the return on
23capital in the economy, due to its decreasing marginal returns. Moreover the presence
of ﬁnancing frictions lowers the frequency of risky innovation. This happens despite the
ﬁnancing constraint is never binding for a ﬁrm which is currently trying to innovate.10
Innovation is instead deterred by future expected ﬁnancing constraints, because the lower
is τ, the larger is the downpayment needed to ﬁnance ﬁxed investment. If ﬁnancial wealth
wt is low, the ﬁrm expects its future ﬁxed investment to be ﬁnancially constrained, and
therefore expects not to be able fully exploit the advantage of a successful innovation, and
thus ﬁnds innovation to be less proﬁtable ex ante.
Surprisingly, table V also shows that ﬁnancing constraints dampen the negative rela-
tionship between uncertainty and innovation, so that this is almost completely eliminated
in the more constrained economy. The explanation is simple. In the benchmark simula-
tion entrepreneurial ﬁrms with very low ﬁnancial wealth wt are not ﬁnancially constrained
and their investment decisions are determined by the optimality condition (21). This con-
dition implies that uncertainty matters more the less diversiﬁed the ﬁrm is. Therefore
the lower is wealth, the higher is the sensitivity of risky innovation to the amount of
background risk.
On the contrary, in the simulations with smaller τ, entrepreneurial ﬁrms with low
wt are ﬁnancially constrained and their investment decisions are determined by their
availability of funds rather than by the optimality condition (21).
III Empirical analysis
The simulations of the general equilibrium entrepreneurial economy illustrated above de-
termine the following testable predictions:
10An innovating ﬁrm expects its productivity to be low, because the probability to fail is high. As a
consequence, it will choose a small amount of ﬁxed capital kt.
24Prediction I: An increase in uncertainty, as measured by the volatility of proﬁts, neg-
atively aﬀects the risky innovation of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, while it does not aﬀect the
risky innovation of non entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
prediction I bis: An increase in uncertainty does not aﬀect the risky innovation of
diversiﬁed entrepreneurial ﬁrms and/or of ﬁnancially constrained entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
Prediction II: An increase in uncertainty does not aﬀect the technological adoption of
both entrepreneurial and non entrepreneurial ﬁrms.
I test these predictions on a dataset of small and medium Italian manufacturing ﬁrms
based on the 1995, 1998 and 2001 Mediocredito Centrale Surveys. Each Survey covers
the activity of a sample of more than 4400 small and medium manufacturing ﬁrms in
the three previous years. Mediocredito Centrale selected these samples balancing the
criteria of randomness and continuity. Each survey contains three consecutive years of
data. After the third year, 2/3 of the sample is replaced and the new sample is then
kept for the three following years. The information provided in the surveys includes
detailed qualitative information on property structure, employment, R&D and innovation,
internationalization and ﬁnancial structure. In addition to this qualitative information,
Mediocredito Centrale also provides, for most of the ﬁrms in the sample, an unbalanced
panel with some balance sheet data items going back in time as far as 1989.
This dataset has several useful features. First, it includes direct qualitative information
not only on the amount spent by each ﬁrm in R&D, but also on the type of ﬁxed investment
and R&D expenditure. This information can be used to identify which ﬁrms are investing
in projects that involve risky innovation.11 Second, it includes information about the
11Other authors have been analysing the innovation data of the Mediocredito Surveys. Hall, Lotti
and Mairesse (2006) study the relationship between employment, innovation and productivity. Parisi,
Schiantarelli and Sembebelli (2006) study the relationship between productivity, innovation and R&D.
Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2006) analyse the eﬀect of banking development on ﬁrm inno-
vation.
25property structure of the ﬁrms, which allows to identify which ﬁrms are “entrepreneurial”,
in the sense that they are owned and managed by the same individual. Third, it includes
additional information that can be used to control for the eﬀect of other factors that are
potentially important for innovation, such as ﬁnancing constraints, market structure and
internationalization.
The main limitation of this dataset is the lack of information about the assets of the
entrepreneurial households that are not included in the balance sheet of the ﬁrm. On the
one hand this is not a problem for the test of predictions I and II. On the other hand
prediction 1bis implies that the negative relationship between risk and innovation is driven
by the ﬁrms in the sample that do not diversify the risk. In the following sections I will
show some empirical evidence in support of this prediction using the information about
the ﬁnancial assets of the ﬁrms.
A Construction of the dataset
I select the sample of entrepreneurial ﬁrms using the following property structure in-
formation from the surveys. Firms are asked if their three largest shareholders: i) are
individuals, ﬁnancial companies or industrial companies; ii) have the direct control of the
ﬁrm. Finally, for each of these shareholders is speciﬁed their share of ownership in the
ﬁrm.
Using this information I select as “entrepreneurial” those ﬁrms that: a) have one
individual that owns at least 50% of the shares of the ﬁrm; b) are actively managed by
this individual.
In the model the entrepreneurial households own 100% of the shares of their ﬁrms.
Therefore criterion (a) may seem too weak. However I argue that this is not the case,
and that this selection criterion is the most eﬃcient in identifying “family ﬁrms” that
26eﬀectively are fully owned and managed by a single entrepreneurial household. This
claim can be veriﬁed using the information provided by the 1995 survey, where ﬁrms also
indicate, in case more than one shareholder is an individual, whether there are family ties
among them (unfortunately this information is not included in the 1998 and 2001 surveys).
I consider the ﬁrms classiﬁed as entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the 1995 survey, according to
the criteria (a) and (b). Among all the entrepreneurial ﬁr m st h a th a v em o r et h a no n e
shareholder, 94% have other individuals as shareholders, and 71% have family ties among
all the shareholders.
In the full sample composed of the three surveys, 33.2% of the ﬁrms are classiﬁed as
entrepreneurial. The sorting criterion is fairly stable over time, so that if I exclude from
the entrepreneurial group those ﬁrms that are present in more than one survey, and are not
selected as entrepreneurial ﬁrms in all the surveys, the ratio falls very little, from 33.2%
to 30.2%. Table VI illustrates some summary statistics about the ﬁrms in the dataset.
Entrepreneurial ﬁrms are on average younger, smaller, and they have a marginally higher
return on capital.
B Estimation strategy
I identify the investment in innovation using the direct questions in the Mediocredito
Surveys. In the section with the heading “Technological innovation and R&D”, ﬁrms are
asked whether they engaged, in the previous three years, in R&D expenditure. The ﬁrms
that answer yes (37% of the total) are asked what percentage of this expenditure was
directed to: i) improve existing products; ii) improve existing productive processes; iii)
introduce new products; iv) introduce new productive processes; v) other objectives.
Furthermore, in the section of the survey with the heading “Investment”, ﬁrms are
asked if they undertook new investment in plant and/or equipment in the three previous
27years. The ﬁrms that answer yes (89% of the total) are asked to specify to what extent the
ﬁxed investment had the following objectives: i) improve existing products; ii) increase
the production of existing products; iii) produce new products; iv) other objectives. For
each chosen answer the ﬁrm indicates three possible degrees of intensity: low, medium
and high.
I use the questions above to construct indicators of risky innovation activity. It is
plausible to assume that on average the innovation related to the introduction of new
products is likely to be risky, because of demand uncertainty. Conversely the innovation
directed either to improve existing products or to innovate the productive processes is less
risky, and analogous to the technology adoption case considered in the simulations. It is
important to notice that this mapping between the innovation decision in the model and
in the empirical data is consistent with the view that product innovation may be chosen
by the ﬁrm as part of a diversiﬁcation strategy. In fact also in the model the investment
in risky innovation is a diversiﬁcation opportunity, because its outcome is independent
from the ε shock . However, the simulations of the model show that such independent
risks interact in a signiﬁcant way. They show that, for realistic levels of concentration
of entrepreneurial wealth, an increase in one of the two independent risks signiﬁcantly
reduces the willingness to take on the other risk.
Therefore, I summarize the information about innovation and technology adoption in
the four following variables. The variable that identiﬁes risky innovation is r&d_inni,p,
w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i fm o r et h a n5 0 %o fR&D spending of ﬁrm i in survey p is directed
to develop new products, and zero otherwise. r&d_t.a.i,p, t h ev a r i a b l et h a ti d e n t i ﬁes
“technology adoption” (less risky innovation) is equal to 1 if ﬁrm i did R&D activity
in survey p and r&d_inni,p =0 , and zero otherwise. An alternative indicator of risky
28innovation is fix_inni,p, w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i fﬁxed investment spending of ﬁrm i is
partly or fully directed to the introduction of new products, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Finally fix_t.ai,p is equal to 1 if ﬁrm i undertook a new ﬁxed investment project but
fix_inni,p =0and 0 otherwise. Table VII reports the percentage of ﬁrms selected
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁve criteria above. It shows that entrepreneurial ﬁrms on average engage
less in R&D than non entrepreneurial ﬁrms. Moreover a similar proportion of ﬁrms in both
groups invests in ﬁxed capital in order to improve existing products or to introduce new
productive processes, while entrepreneurial ﬁrms on average are less likely to introduce
new products.
Before testing the predictions of the model, I provide some anecdotal evidence in
support of the claim that the innovation variables selected above are correlated with the
average riskiness of the ﬁrms in the sample. The model predicts that conditional on
innovating a ﬁrm expects an higher volatility of its future revenues. Figures 1-3 show the
correlation between the average volatility of proﬁts across ﬁrms in each 3 digit sector and
the frequency of the diﬀerent types of innovations. Figure 1 shows that on average sectors
with an higher fraction of ﬁrms doing R&d also have an higher cross sectional dispersion
of returns. Figures 2 and 3 show that the dispersion of returns is also increasing in the
ratio of product innovation over process innovation. These unconditional correlations
are consistent with the claim that product innovation is on average more risky than the
innovation directed to improve the current production.
C Estimation results
It e s tp r e d i c t i o n s1 ,1 bis and 2 by regressing the two dichotomous variables representing the
“risky innovation” decision r&d_inn and fix_inn, and the two dichotomous variables
representing the “technology adoption” decision r&d_t.a. and fix_t,a, on a measure of
29idiosyncratic uncertainty:
yi,p = α0 + α1riski,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p + α4constrainedi,p + (32)







The dependent variable yi,p is one of the indicators of innovation described above. The
independent variable riski,p is the indicator of idiosyncratic uncertainty. I include in
the regression also the following control variables: returni,p, which is an indicator of
the average proﬁtability of ﬁrm i. This variable is important, because it controls for
the possibility that higher uncertainty may aﬀect innovation indirectly by increasing the
average expected return.12 exporti,p is equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm i exports part of
its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. The variable capturing market
structure is supplyi,p, which is equal to 1 (44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output
based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable
capturing ﬁnancing constraints is constrainedi,p, which is equal to one if ﬁrm i declares
ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero otherwise.13 The other control variables are sizei,p,
which is the number of employees of ﬁrm i,a n dagei,p, w h i c hi st h ea g eo fﬁrm i (relative
to the year of the survey) measured in years. Finally, d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector
dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of survey dummy variables. Unless otherwise
speciﬁed, all the estimations presented below are with the standard errors clustered at
the 3 digit sector level.
Table VIII reports the estimation of equation (32) where the measure of uncertainty
12This possibility is ruled out in the simulations by construction, because uncertainty aﬀects the volatil-
ity of proﬁts but not the expected productivity of capital.
13Firms are asked the three following questions about ﬁnancing problems: 1) “during the last year,
did the ﬁrm desire to borrow more at the interest rate prevailing on the market?”. 2) “If the previous
answer was yes: was the ﬁrm willing to pay and higher interest rate in order to get additional credit?”. 3)
“During the last year, did the ﬁrm ask for more credit without obtaining it?”. The variable constrainedi,p
is equal to one if the answer to any of the three previous questions is positive.
30riski,p is equal to roa_stdev_6i,p, which is the standard deviation of the gross income/assets
ratio for ﬁrm i in the six years before survey p.F o re x a m p l ei fﬁrm i is surveyed by the
1995 Mediocredito Survey, roa_stdev_6i is relative to the 1989-1994 period. For con-
sistency the variable returni,p is equal to the average gross income/assets ratio for ﬁrm
i in the six years before survey p, called roa_avg_6i,p. The regression results in table
VIII conﬁrm prediction 1, because they show that risk negatively aﬀects the innovation
of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. For these ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient of roa_stdev_6i is negative and
signiﬁcant both using r&d_inni and fix_inni as dependent variables (columns 1 and 5).
Conversely the same coeﬃcient is much smaller and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
for the other ﬁrms. Furthermore table VIII is also consistent with prediction 2, because
risk does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the innovation that is related to the improvement of the
existing production (dependent variables r&d_t.ai and fix_t.a.i).
One obvious problem with using roa_stdev_6i as a measure of idiosyncratic risk is
its endogeneity. Some ﬁrms may innovate more than other ﬁrms on average, and as a
consequence they may also be more risky. Therefore in table IX I consider an exogenous
measure of uncertainty, the variable sdroa_1s.p. This variable is equal to the cross sectional
standard deviation of the return on assets for the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the
most recent year of survey p (e.g. year 1994 for the 1995 Survey).14 sdroa_1s,p varies
both across sectors and across surveys, and it has 191 diﬀerent observations in total.
Even though this variable is exogenous from the point of view of the single ﬁrm, it may
still be aﬀected by sector speciﬁc omitted variables. The robustness of the results to this
potential problem are analyzed in the next section.
14I consider the most recent available year of each survey as it includes an higher number of observations.
This is because not all ﬁrms have balance sheet data for all the three years in the survey. Nonetheless the
results do not diﬀer substantially if I consider a cross sectional measure of risk that covers all the three
years in the survey instead.
31As control variables I include the same ones included before, except for returni,p,which
is now equal to the cross sectional mean of the return on assets for each sector, called
avgroa_1s,p. The results shown in table IX conﬁrm again predictions 1 and 2. An in-
crease in uncertainty measured by the sdroa_1s,p variable has a signiﬁcant and negative
eﬀect on the investment in risky innovation of the entrepreneurial ﬁrms, while it does
not aﬀect the investment in risky innovation of the other ﬁrms. Importantly, while en-
trepreneurial and non entrepreneurial ﬁrms diﬀer with respect to the correlation between
risk and innovation, they do not diﬀer much with respect to the signiﬁcance of the other
control variables. With respect to the regressions that use r&d_inni,p and fix_inni,p as
dependent variables, I ﬁnd that ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tm o r ea n dl a r g e rﬁr m si n n o v a t em o r e .
Conversely ﬁrms that produce based on orders of downstream ﬁrms rather than for the
market innovate less. These ﬁndings may be explained by the fact that large ﬁrms that
produce for the market and that export abroad are more pressured to innovate by their
own competitors.
Conversely, the regressions that uses fix_t.a.i as the dependent variable show that
ﬁrms that install new ﬁxed capital to improve the existing production have opposite
characteristics: they export less and they produce more upon orders and less for the
market.
D Robustness checks
In this section I perform several robustness checks of the consistency between the predic-
tions of the model and the empirical evidence.
32D.1 Financing constraints and diversiﬁcation
The ﬁrst robustness check is related to the prediction of the model that the presence of
ﬁnancing constraints reduces the negative eﬀect of uncertainty on the risky innovation
of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. Table X replicates the analysis in table IX after excluding the
14% of ﬁrms that declare ﬁnancing problems in any of the three surveys. The results
are consistent with the predictions of the model. The comparison between tables IX
and X shows that excluding ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms increases the negative eﬀect
of uncertainty on risky innovation. Moreover the bottom part of table X shows that the
negative eﬀect of risk on innovation disappears when the model is estimated for ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms only.
The second robustness check is related to the prediction of the model that the nega-
tive eﬀect of uncertainty on risky innovation only holds for undiversiﬁed entrepreneurial
households. More precisely, simulation results show that the entrepreneurial households
that hold an amount of ﬁnancial assets relatively large with respect to the size of their
business are not substantially aﬀected by changes in uncertainty. In order to verify this
prediction I construct the following measure of the ﬁnancial assets of the ﬁrm. The vari-
able fin_ai,t is equal to the ratio between the net ﬁnancial assets of ﬁrm i (ﬁnancial
investment + liquidity + short term ﬁnancial credit - short term ﬁnancial debt) divided
by the total assets of ﬁrm i in period t. I eliminate the largest 1% and smallest 1% values
as outliers. The measure of diversiﬁcation I consider is diversi,p, which is the average of
fin_ai,t across the three years of survey p.T h e m e a n o fdiversi,p is equal to 0.38, and
its standard deviation is equal to 0.21. I verify prediction Ibis in table XI, where I esti-
mate equation (32) using the risky innovation indicators r&d_inni,p and fix_inni,p as
dependent variables and separating ﬁrms according to the value of the variable diversi,p.
33The 0.5 cutoﬀ point is chosen because the simulation results indicate that at this level of
ﬁnancial wealth an entrepreneurial ﬁrm is suﬃciently diversiﬁed so that, unless it is very
risk averse, its innovation decisions are no longer aﬀected by changes in uncertainty. I
also estimate the model for ﬁrms with diversi,p higher than 0.75. This higher threshold
for diversiﬁed entrepreneurial ﬁr m si sj u s t i ﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h em e a s u r eo fd i v e r s i ﬁ-
cation is computed in the simulated data using the value of the ﬁrm’s future proﬁts at
the denominator. Instead in the empirical data this is substituted with the book value
of the assets, which is likely to underestimate the real value of the ﬁrm. The estimation
results conﬁrm the prediction that the negative eﬀect of risk on innovation is driven by
the undiversiﬁed entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p becomes not signiﬁ-
cant for high levels of diversiﬁcation as measured by the variable diversi,p.I m p o r t a n t l y ,
also in this case there are few substantial variations in the coeﬃcients of the other main
determinants of innovation across the diﬀerent regressions.
As I argued above, these results are unlikely to be driven by the fact that low diversi,p
ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, because both the model and the regression results
above show that ﬁnancing constraints reduce rather than increase the negative eﬀect of
risk on the innovation decisions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. This is conﬁrmed by table XII,
which splits the sample in the same way as table XI but also it excludes from the sample
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. In this case the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p becomes more
signiﬁcant and larger in absolute value for “low diversi,p” ﬁrms.
D.2 Endogeneity problems
In the previous section I argued that the uncertainty measure sdroa_1s,p is exogenous
from the point of view of the single ﬁrms, while it may still be correlated to sectorial char-
acteristics that may cause endogeneity and omitted variable problems in the estimation
34of equation (32).
This section veriﬁes that the observed negative relationship between uncertainty and
entrepreneurial innovation is not driven by such unobserved characteristics. It is worth-
while to notice that the results presented above already provide two argument to reject
such claim. First, the test of the model is based on ﬁnding a diﬀerential eﬀect of un-
certainty on the diﬀerent types of innovation decisions of entrepreneurial versus non en-
trepreneurial ﬁrms. The results conﬁrm this diﬀerential eﬀect, and ﬁnd that the only
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of uncertainty on innovation regards the innovation to develop
new products by entrepreneurial ﬁrms, as predicted by the model. Therefore any endo-
geneity problem that biases the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o nf o ra l lﬁrms
and for all types of innovation cannot explain this ﬁnding.
Second, the most likely endogeneity problem in the estimation of equation (32) is that
some ﬁrms may belong to more dynamic sectors, with more innovation on average and
also higher volatility and cross sectional dispersion of proﬁts. But this type of endogeneity
should bias the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p upwards rather than downwards, and therefore
it should bias the estimations towards rejecting rather than accepting prediction 1. This
claim is conﬁrmed by table XIII, which estimates the eﬀect of uncertainty with and
without including the set of control variables. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns estimate the model
with r&d_inni,p as dependent variable. In column (1) no control variable is included.
In column (2) I include only the sector and survey dummies. In column (3) I include
the control variables representing internationalization and market structure, in column
(4) the variable that controls for the average proﬁtability of the ﬁrms in the sectors, and
ﬁnally in column (5) the full speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p is negative and
signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations except than in column (1). In this case the coeﬃcient
35of sdroa_1s,p becomes positive, because the volatility of proﬁts and the frequency of
innovation are positively correlated across 2 digit sectors and across surveys, and therefore
if these dummies are omitted the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p is biased upwards. The presence
of this bias is conﬁrmed by the fact that the increase in the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p also
happens for non entrepreneurial ﬁr m s( s e et h el a s tr o wo ft a b l eX I I I ) .S i m i l a rr e s u l t sa r e
found when I use fix_inni,p as dependent variable (second part of the table).
Therefore, for the results presented above to be explained by an endogeneity problem,
it should be that some other factor, which varies across three digits sectors, is at the
same time negatively correlated with the risky innovation of entrepreneurial ﬁrms and
positively correlated with the volatility of proﬁts in the sector.
In the two tables below I provide two further robustness checks that control for this
hypothesis. In table XIV I include in the estimation 3 digit sector dummies. This im-
plies that the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s is identiﬁed only by changes in each sector over
time rather than by changes across sectors. The combined presence of 3 digit sector
ﬁxed eﬀects and survey ﬁxed eﬀects controls for the impact of any sector speciﬁcu n -
observed variable and for any survey speciﬁce ﬀect. Moreover I substitute the control
variables supplyi,p,constrained i,p,roa_avg_6i,p,ln(sizei,p),age i,p and age2
i,p with sector
speciﬁc variables. For example I substitute constrainedi,p with constraineds,p, which is
the fraction of constrained ﬁrms in sector s and survey p. This change takes into account
t h ef a c tt h a ts u c hv a r i a b l e sa tt h eﬁrm level are also possibly endogenous. Table XIV
shows that the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p is very similar, across the diﬀerent groups, to
the coeﬃcient estimated in the regressions that included only 2 digit sector dummies (see
table IX). At the bottom of table XIV, I report the estimated coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p
for the groups of ﬁrms selected according to diversiﬁcation and to ﬁnancing constraints.
36These results are also broadly consistent with those in the previous tables. Finally, table
XV proposes an instrumental variable estimation. The model is similar to the model
estimated in the previous table XIV with the only diﬀerence that it is estimated as a
linear model with instrumental variables, and that its standard errors are not clustered.
The choice of using a linear IV estimator is justiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a ta l lt h ep r e v i o u s
regression results change relatively little if I estimate them as linear models rather than
as Probit models. The variable sdroa_1s,p is instrumented using the following variables:
sdroa_1s,p−1 and avgroa_1s,p−1, which are the cross sectional volatility and mean of re-
turn on assets for the sector s in the previous survey; sd_outputs,p and sd_outputs,p−1,
which are the standard deviations of the trend deviations of an index of revenues for sector
s during the last year of survey p and p − 1 respectively.15 These last two instruments
are computed using monthly data from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) for all
manufacturing 3 digit sectors. Therefore they are based on a time series of data and on a
sample diﬀerent from the sample of the Mediocredito Surveys. In the context of this IV
approach it is not feasible to cluster the standard errors in this regression. Nonetheless
standard errors are computed using a robust 2 step procedure, and the estimation of the
previous models showed that robust standard errors do not change signiﬁcantly with or
without clustering at the 3 digit sector level. Table XV reports, for brevity, only the esti-
mates of the coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s,p for all the diﬀerent regressions. It also reports the
F−statistic of the excluded instruments calculated in the ﬁrst stage and the p-value of the
Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions. Both statistics show that the validity of the
instruments is not rejected across almost all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The α1 coeﬃcient
measuring the sensitivity of innovation to uncertainty follows the same pattern observed
15Before detrending, the indexes have been deseasonalised.
37in the previous tables, even though is generally more noisily estimated. Nonetheless the
results still conﬁrm all the prediction of the model. First, the decisions to improve the
existing production r&d_t.a. and fix_t.a. are not aﬀected by uncertainty for all ﬁrm.
Second, the negative eﬀect of uncertainty on the product innovation of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms increases for less diversiﬁed ﬁrms, especially after excluding ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms.16 Indeed among the less diversiﬁed and not ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, the eﬀect
of uncertainty on product innovation is negative and signiﬁcant for entrepreneurial ﬁrms
for both the r&d_inn and fix_inn indicators, while is much smaller and not signiﬁcant
for the other ﬁrms.
IV Conclusions
This paper studies the eﬀect of entrepreneurial risk on the relationship between un-
certainty and innovation. I consider a model of an economy where undiversiﬁable en-
trepreneurial risk matters in equilibrium for the investment decisions of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms. In this context I analyze the implications of this risk for the relationship between
uncertainty and risky innovation. I show that an increase in uncertainty adversely aﬀects
the investment in risky innovation of entrepreneurial ﬁr m s ,w h i l ei td o e sn o ta ﬀect the
innovation decisions of risk neutral ﬁr m s .T h ep r e d i c t i o n so ft h em o d e la r ec o n ﬁrmed by
the empirical analysis of a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing ﬁrms.
The main message of this paper is that the eﬀect of uncertainty on entrepreneurial
innovation is quantitatively signiﬁcant. The estimation results imply that if the cross
sectional volatility of proﬁts increases from 0.078 (the median value) to 0.097 (the 90%
16The criterion to identify more diversiﬁed ﬁrms is a value of diversi,p greater than 0.3 instead of greater
than 0.5. This is because for this IV estimation the 0.5 threshold would leave too few observations in the
sample and it would not allow to compute robust two step standard errors.
38percentile), the probability to do R&D to introduce new products for an entrepreneurial
ﬁrm decreases from 14.7% to 11.8%. If one believes that the level of uncertainty faced by
ﬁr m sv a r i e ss i g n i ﬁcantly in the business cycle, and that entrepreneurial innovation may
be a source of growth and positive externalities for the economy, then this ﬁnding implies
that the eﬀect of entrepreneurial risk on innovation may be an important factor for both
business cycle ﬂuctuations and growth.
The second message of the paper relates to the previous literature on entrepreneurial
households. Many authors have been focusing on borrowing constraints as an important
factor that inﬂuences entry in the entrepreneurial sector, the wealth distribution and cap-
ital accumulation in the economy (see for example Caggetti and De Nardi, 2006). In
contrast, this paper shows that undiversiﬁable risk is also important to understand the
investment decisions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. In particular, it shows that such risk im-
plies that the negative impact of uncertainty on entrepreneurial innovation is strongest
in economies with more eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets and less ﬁnancially constrained en-
trepreneurs.
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41V Appendix 1
The dynamic investment problem of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is solved with a numer-
ical method. First, I discretise the state space of the state variables wt and At in
grids of 100 points and 5 points respectively. Then I formulate an initial guess of
Et [V (St+1,w t+1,A t+1)], and I use it to compute the value functions V
up
t (St,w t,A t) and
V
noup
t (St,w t,A t). Then I compare the two function and determine the new guess of
V (St,w t,A t). I iterate again this process until the value function converges. The ﬁnal out-
come is the optimal policy functions of consumption ct (St,w t,A t), capital kt+1 (St,w t,A t),
borrowing bt+1 (St,w t,A t) and innovation decision It (St,w t,A t). The dynamic investment
problem of the risk neutral ﬁrm is solved using a similar procedure.
42Figure 1: R&D and the cross sectional dispersion of returns
Cross sectional standard deviation of the 








0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Fraction of firms doing R&D
43Figure 2: Relative frequency of R&D directed to introduce new products and the cross
sectional dispersion of returns
Cross sectional standard deviation of the profits/sales 
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44Figure 3: Relative frequency of new ﬁxed investment directed to introduce new products
and the cross sectional dispersion of returns
Cross sectional standard deviation of the profits/sales 
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45Table I: Calibrated parameters
Value Matched moment Data Simulations
α 0.865 Average(net income/sales)∗ 0.136 0.115
δ 0.145 Average depreciation of capital 14.5% 14.5%
ξ 15% Average frequency of innovation∗∗ 14% 14%
θ(SH)+θ(SL)
2 0.05 st. dev (net income/sales)∗ 0.09 0.10
β
d 0.971 real interest rate 3% 3%
β
e 0.942
% of private equity from entrepreneurial households
with concentration ≥ 75% 48% 48%
g 0.4 Cost of innovation as a fraction of the value of assets 3.75% 5%
Other benchmark parameters: η =2 ;φ =0 .05; A =1 ;A =0 .61;δA ∈ (0.06 − 0.054);θ(SH) −
θ(SL)=0 .05,ρ =0 .8, γ =0 .4, b =0 .75,τ =0 .9
*Statistics computed using the 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumers Finances, where only en-
trepreneurs that own and manage a manufacturing company are included, and also excluding as outliers the
observations greater than one in absolute value. ∗∗ Fraction of entrepreneurial ﬁrms that declare to perform
R&D in order to introduce new products.
46Table II: Investment in ﬁxed capital and innovation, benchmark parameters, risky inno-
vation and technology adoption





















Standard deviation of the net profits/sales ratio
Benchmark .0986 .0889 .1070 .0964 .0882 .1036
Higher uncertainty .1164 .0975 .1325 .1266 .1064 .1440
Risk neutral ﬁrms,
benchmark .1012 .0910 .1105 .1196 .0996 .1367
Risk neutral ﬁrms,
higher uncertainty .1196 .0996 .1367 .1272 .1068 .1448
Return on capital
Benchmark 2.408% 2.386% 2.430% 4.002% 3.994% 4.009%
Higher uncertainty 2.473% 2.421% 2.525% 4.093% 4.068% 4.118%
Risk neutral ﬁrms 2.340% 2.340% 2.340% 3.986% 3.986% 3.986%
Average capital
Benchmark 103.2 104.0 102.4 64.4 64.7 64.1
Higher uncertainty 99.1 100.8 97.5 62.7 63.6 61.9
Risk neutral ﬁrms 108.7 108.7 108.7 66.0 66.0 66.0
Frequency of innovation
Benchmark 13.61% 13.87% 13.35% 13.50% 13.48% 13.52%
Higher uncertainty 13.26% 13.78% 12.73% 13.79% 13.80% 13.67%
Risk neutral ﬁrms 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8%
47Table III: Investment in ﬁxed capital and innovation, comparison between stochastic de-
preciation and deterministic depreciation of technology (economy with high uncertainty)





















Return on capital 2.473% 2.421% 2.525% 1.890% 1.864% 1.912%
Average capital 99.1 100.8 97.5 83.6 85.3 81.8
Frequency of innovation 13.26% 13.78% 12.73% 16.86% 17.40% 16.32%
Frequency of innovation,
risk neutral ﬁrms 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 17.2% 17.2% 17.2%






















Standard deviation of the net profits/sales ratio
η =1 .1 .1007 .0905 .1098 .1185 .0992 .1350
η =2(benchmark) .0986 .0889 .1070 .1164 .0975 .1325
η =3 .0961 .0865 .1048 .1141 .0947 .1305
mixed types∗ .1007 .0888 .1112 .1290 .0913 .1579
Return on capital
η =1 .1 2.360% 2.351% 2.370% 2.400% 2.372% 2.427%
η =2(benchmark) 2.408% 2.386% 2.430% 2.473% 2.421% 2.525%
η =3 2.463% 2.429% 2.497% 2.555% 2.489% 2.622%
mixed types∗ 2.394% 2.375% 2.414% 2.476% 2.408% 2.544%
Average capital
η =1 .1 106.6 107.1 106.2 104.7 105.7 103.7
η =2(benchmark) 103.2 104.0 102.4 99.1 100.8 97.5
η =3 98.7 99.7 97.6 93.5 95.8 91.1
mixed types∗ 104.3 105.1 103.6 99.7 102.4 97.1
Frequency of innovation, all entrepreneurs
η =1 .1 14.17% 14.24% 14.09% 13.96% 14.25% 13.66%
η =2(benchmark) 13.61% 13.87% 13.35% 13.26% 13.78% 12.73%
η =3 12.90% 13.27% 12.54% 11.95% 12.73% 11.17%
mixed types∗ 13.77% 13.96% 13.59% 13.45% 14.00% 12.89%
Frequency of innovation, diversiﬁed entrepreneurs ( wt
V M
t +wt ≥ 0.5)
η =1 .1 3.15% 3.15% 3.15% 3.33% 3.50% 3.10%
η =2(benchmark) 3.11% 3.07% 3.17% 2.71% 2.95% 2.51%
η =3 2.48% 2.26% 2.64% 2.76% 3.25% 2.40%
mixed types∗ 9.18% 9.34% 9.02% 8.76% 9.13% 8.41%
Frequency of innovation, undiversiﬁed entrepreneurs ( wt
V M
t +wt < 0.5)
η =1 .1 14.48% 14.52% 14.43% 14.24% 14.47% 14.01%
η =2(benchmark) 13.85% 14.13% 13.57% 13.42% 13.92% 12.92%
η =3 13.02% 13.35% 12.69% 12.19% 12.98% 11.39%
mixed types∗ 15.31% 15.50% 15.11% 14.86% 15.46% 14.25%
∗ 50% of the entrepreneurial ﬁrms have high volatility of proﬁts (θL =0 .03;θH =0 .12) and low risk aversion
(η =1 .1). The remaining 50% of the entrepreneurial ﬁrms have low volatility of proﬁts (θL =0 .06;θH =0 .09)
and high risk aversion (η =3 ) .



































Standard deviation of the net profits/sales ratio
Benchmark .0889 .1070 .0872 .1060 .0898 .1083
Higher uncertainty .0970 .1318 .0955 .1319 .0980 .1333
Return on capital
Benchmark 2.386% 2.430% 2.616% 2.644% 3.023% 3.031%
Higher uncertainty 2.427% 2.540% 2.637% 2.697% 3.040% 3.067%
Average capital
Benchmark 104.0 102.4 91.2 90.2 74.5 74.1
Higher uncertainty 100.0 96.8 89.9 87.9 73.8 73.0
Frequency of innovation
Benchmark 13.87% 13.35% 12.33% 12.05% 10.67% 10.51%
Higher uncertainty 13.78% 11.73% 12.09% 11.75% 10.61% 10.34%





Mean n. employees 45 183
Median n. employees 25 41
Mean age 23 27
Median age 19 21
Mean operative income / total assets 7.4% 6.8%
%o fe x p o r t i n gﬁrms 66% 71%
Number of ﬁrm-survey observations 4505 9084
51Table VII: Share of ﬁr m st h a ti n v e s ti ni n n o v a t i o n
Entrepreneurial ﬁrms Other ﬁrms
r&d
No r&d 69% 59%
r&d_innov =1 15% 20%
r&d_t.a =1 16% 21%
New fixed investment
No new ﬁxed inv. 15% 9%
fix_innov 26% 31%
fix_t.a. 59% 60%
52Table VIII: The relationship between risk and innovation
yi,p = α0 + α1roa_stdev_6i,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p + α4constrainedi,p+






yi,p = r&d_inni,p yi,p = r&d_t.ai,p yi,p = fix_inni,p yi,p = fix_t.a.i,p
entr. other entr. other entr. other entr. other
α1 -2.29* 0.03 -0.57 -0.10 -3.21** -0.95 0.71 -0.51
(-1.6) (0.1) (-0.4) (-0.1) (-2.5) (-1.4) (0.7) (-0.8)
α2 0.47*** 0.49*** -0.02 0.25*** 0.23** 0.25*** -0.15* -0.13**
(3.8) (6.4) (-0.1) (3.8) (2.5) (4.1) (-1.7) (-2.2)
α3 -0.18* -0.16*** 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13*** 0.03 0.14***
(-1.9) (-3.1) (0.8) (-0.7) (-0.1) (-2.7) (0.3) (3.1)
α4 0.24* 0.18** 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.19*** 0.07 -0.13*
(1.9) (2.3) (0.6) (-1.3) (-0.4) (2.7) (0.6) (-1.8)
α5 -0.22 0.58 1.97*** -0.14 1.04 0.67* 0.78 0.34
(-0.3) (1.5) (2.7) (-0.4) (1.4) (1.9) (1.1) (1.0)
α6 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.14*** -0.01 -.003
(4.1) (10.5) (3.3) (5.6) (4.0) (6.9) (-0.2) (-0.1)
α7 0.003 0.05 -.001 -.004 0.01 0.01 -.005 -.001
(0.5) (1.2) (-0.2) (-1.2) (0.8) (1.3) (-0.9) (-0.4)
α8 -0.00003 -.0001*** .00003 .0001*** -.0001* -.0001*** .0001* .0001*
(-0.6) (-2.9) (0.7) (3.1) (-1.7) (-2.7) (1.8) (1.8)
n.obs 1344 3811 1338 3811 1342 3813 1342 3815
Pseudo R2 13.19 11.24 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Huber/White/sandwich
estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digits
sector level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; ***
signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. roa_stdev_6i,p : standard deviation of the gross income/assets
ratio for ﬁrm i in the six years before the survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm i exports
part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : e q u a lt o1( 4 4 % )i fﬁrm
i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero
otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero
otherwise. roa_avg_6i.p : average gross income/assets ratio for ﬁrm i in the six years before the
survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the
survey) in years. d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy
variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
53Table IX: The relationship between risk and innovation. Exogenous risk measure
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p + α4constrainedi,p+






yi,p = r&d_inni,p yi,p = r&d_t.ai,p yi,p = fix_inni,p yi,p = fix_t.a.i,p
entr. other entr. other entr. other entr. other
α1 -5.04** -1.87 3.31 1.16 -4.62** -1.01 2.16 -0.22
(-2.3) (-1.3) (1.5) (0.9) (-2.5) (-0.8) (1.2) (-0.2)
α2 0.37*** 0.52*** .26*** 0.32*** 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.07 -0.11***
(5.4) (10.4) (4.4) (7.6) (3.4) (6.1) (-1.3) (-3.0)
α3 -.24*** -0.15*** 0.07 -0.03 -0.10** -0.15 0.14*** 0.17***
(-4.0) (-4.0) (1.3) (-0.8) (-2.0) (-4.4) (2.9) (5.5)
α4 0.06 0.18*** 0.042 0.013 0.09 0.18*** -0.04 -0.12***
(0.9) (3.6) (0.6) (0.3) (1.5) (4.0) (-1.5) (-2.6)
α5 -1.62 -0.78 -2.98 -0.09 4.36** 2.40* -2.13 -0.04
(-0.7) (-0.5) (-1.4) (-0.1) (2.2) (1.8) (-1.2) (-0.1)
α6 .25*** 0.24*** .18*** 0.13*** 0.27*** 0.18*** -0.05 -0.05***
(7.0) (15.4) (5.4) (8.8) (8.4) (12.8) (-1.5) (-3.3)
α7 0.003 0.006* -0.002 -0.002 0.007** 0.006** -0.01*** -0.004*
(0.8) (1.7) (-0.5) (-1.0) (2.0) (2.2) (-2.8) (-1.8)
α8 -.0001 -.0001*** .0004 .0001*** -.0001** -.0001*** .0001*** .00001***
(-1.1) (-3.2) (0.6) (3.2) (-2.5) (-3.7) (3.2) (3.1)
n.obs 3627 7703 3631 7708 3638 7710 3636 7710
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Huber/White/sandwich
estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digit
sector level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; ***
signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. sdroa_1i,s : standard deviation of the cross section of the gross
income/assets ratio for the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the most recent years of each survey.
exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm i exports part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to
0o t h e r w i s e .supplyi,p : equal to 1 (44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed
by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares
ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero otherwise. avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on
assets for sector s in the most recent year of the survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p :
age of the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the survey) in years. d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy
variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey
p, and equal to zero otherwise.
54Table X: The relationship between risk and innovation. Exogenous risk measure. Finan-
cially constrained ﬁrms excluded
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p+






yi,p = r&d_inni,p yi,p = r&d_t.ai,p yi,p = fix_inni,p yi,p = fix_t.a.i,p
entr. other entr. other entr. other entr. other
α1 -7.36*** -1.77 4.44** 0.78 -5.21** -0.94 2.89 -0.19
(-3.0) (-1.1) (1.9) (0.6) (2.5) (-0.7) (1.5) (-0.2)
α2 0.40*** 0.51*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.16*** 0.25*** -0.05 -0.13***
(5.2) (9.3) (4.4) (7.5) (2.6) (-2.9) (-1.0) (-3.2)
α3 -0.20*** -0.16*** 0.08 -.04 -0.10* -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16***
(-3.2) (-3.7) (1.4) (-1.1) (-1.8) (-3.6) (2.8) (4.6)
α5 -0.49 -2.01 -4.16* 0.80 5.56*** 1.39 -2.75 0.80
(-0.2) (-1.2) (-1.8) (0.5) (2.6) (1.0) (-1.4) (0.6)
α6 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.27*** 0.18*** -0.04 -0.04***
(6.5) (14.6) (5.2) (8.2) (7.9) (12.0) (-1.1) (-2.7)
α7 0.001 0.006 -.0002 -0.002 0.006* 0.004 -0.009** -0.002
(0.2) (1.6) (-0.1) (-0.8) (1.6) (1.4) (-2.4) (-1.0)
α8 -.00003 -.0001*** .00003 .0001*** -.0001** -.0001*** .0001*** .0001**
(-0.6) (-3.0) (0.7) (2.8) (-2.1) (-2.9) (2.6) (2.4)
n.obs 3014 6698 3006 6703 3024 6705 3022 6705
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
Coeﬃcient of sdroa_1s estimated for the group of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms only
α1 4.93 -1.36 -1.74 4.66 -2.26 -0.23 -3.06 -0.81
(1.0) (-0.3) (-0.4) (1.3) (-0.5) (-0.1) (-0.7) (-0.2)
n.obs 599 1002 613 997 590 1002 590 1002
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.06
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Huber/White/sandwich
estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digit sector
level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the
90% conﬁdence level. sdroa_1i,s : standard deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for
the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the most recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of
total) if ﬁrm i exports part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1
(44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero
otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero otherwise.
avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector s in the most recent year of the survey.
sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the survey) in years.
d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy variables that are
e q u a lt o1i fﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
55Table XI: The relationship between risk and innovation. Entrepreneurial ﬁrms selected
according to the degree of diversiﬁcation
yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p + α4constrainedi,p+



















α1 -7.88*** -1.77 3.16 -5.10** -3.97 0.15
(-2.7) (-0.5) (0.6) (-2.1) (-1.3) (0.1)
α2 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.32** 0.26*** 0.10 0.24**
(4.3) (3.2) (2.2) (3.5) (1.2) (2.0)
α3 -0.25*** -0.22** -0.25* -0.12* -0.08 0.07
(-3.3) (-2.3) (-1.7) (-1.8) (-1.0) (0.6)
α4 0.16* -0.14 -0.06 0.07 0.12 0.23*
(1.7) (-1.1) (-0.4) (0.9) (1.2) (1.7)
α5 -0.39 -2.55 -5.01 2.88 6.88** -1.45
(-0.14) (-0.7) (-1.1) (1.1) (2.2) (-0.4)
α6 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.18**
(5.3) (3.6) (0.4) (5.3) (5.4) (2.0)
α7 .002 .003 0.02 .01** .002 -.00003
(0.3) (0.6) (1.5) (2.2) (0.4) (-0.0)
α8 -.00004 -.00005 -0.0003* -.0001** -.00006 -.00003
(-0.7) (-0.8) (-1.7) (-2.4) (-1.1) (-0.2)
n.obs 1958 1669 783 1954 1679 838
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.04
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Hu-
ber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors
are clustered at the 3 digit sector level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at
the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. diversi,p is the average of
the ratio between the net ﬁnancial assets and total assets for ﬁrm i in survey p. sdroa_1i,s :
standard deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for the ﬁrms in the three
digit sector s in the most recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm
i exports part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1
(44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and
equal to zero otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing constraints
(14%), and zero otherwise. avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector
s in the most recent year of the survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of
the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the survey) in years. d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy
variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in
Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
56Table XII: The relationship between risk and innovation, entrepreneurial ﬁrms selected
according to the degree of diversiﬁcation. Financially constrained ﬁrms excluded
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p+



















α1 -12.6*** -1.98 2.04 -6.32** -3.78 -0.001
(-3.8) (-0.6) (0.4) (-2.3) (-1.2) (0.0)
α2 0.47*** 0.33*** 0.31** 0.27*** 0.03 0.10
(4.3) (3.0) (2.0) (3.2) (0.4) (0.8)
α3 -0.24*** -0.18* -0.17 -0.09 -0.11 0.02
(-2.8) (-1.8) (-1.1) (-1.3) (-1.3) (0.1)
α5 2.15 -3.09 -5.04 4.35 7.90** -0.04
(0.7) (-0.9) (-1.1) (1.5) (2.4) (-0.0)
α6 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.29 0.17*
(4.9) (3.3) (0.5) (4.8) (4.9) (1.7)
α7 -.0008 .002 0.02 0.01* .002 -0.002
(-0.1) (0.3) (1.5) (1.7) (0.4) (-0.2)
α8 -.00002 -.00003 -.0003 -.0001* -.00005 .00002
(-0.27) (-0.5) (-1.5) (-1.9) (-1.0) (0.2)
n.obs 1581 1397 668 1578 1439 715
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Hu-
ber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors
are clustered at the 3 digit sector level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at
the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. diversi,p is the average of
the ratio between the net ﬁnancial assets and total assets for ﬁrm i in survey p. sdroa_1i,s :
standard deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for the ﬁrms in the three
digit sector s in the most recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm
i exports part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1
(44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and
equal to zero otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing constraints
(14%), and zero otherwise. avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector
s in the most recent year of the survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of
the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the survey) in years. d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy
variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in
Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
57Table XIII: The relationship between risk and innovation. Exogenous risk measure and
equation selection
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exporti,p + α3supplyi,p+






yi,p = r&d_inni,p (entrepreneurial ﬁrms) yi,p = fix_inni,p (entrepreneurial ﬁrms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
α1 5.01*** -7.58*** -7.62*** -7.38*** -7.36*** 2.79* -3.21* -3.19* -5.18** -5.21**
(3.0) (-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.1) (-3.0) (1.8) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-2.5) (2.5)
α2 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.16***
(6.5) (6.6) (5.2) (4.6) (4.4) (2.6)
α3 -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.11** -0.12** -0.10*
(-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.2) (-2.0) (-2.1) (-1.8)
α5 -0.62 -0.49 4.99** 5.56***













no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
n.obs 3063 3023 3022 3022 3014 3063 3023 3033 3033 3024
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.001 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06
yi,p = r&d_inni,p (non entrepreneurial ﬁrms) yi,p = fix_inni,p (non entrepreneurial ﬁrms)
α1 6.12*** -0.90 -1.69 -0.92 -1.77 4.06*** 0.25 -0.07 -0.48 -0.95
(5.9) (-0.7) (-1.2) (-0.6) (-1.1) (4.2) (0.2) (-0.1) (-0.4) (-0.7)
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Huber/White/sandwich
estimator of the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digit sector
level. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the
90% conﬁdence level. sdroa_1i,s : standard deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for
the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the most recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of
total) if ﬁrm i exports part of its production outside Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1
(44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero
otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero otherwise.
avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector s in the most recent year of the survey.
sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of the ﬁrm (relative to the year of the survey) in years.
d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy variables that are
e q u a lt o1i fﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
58Table XIV: The relationship between risk and innovation. Exogenous risk measure. Fixed
eﬀects at the three digit sector level included
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exports,p + α3supplys,p + α4constraineds,p




yi,p = r&d_inni,p yi,p = r&d_t.ai,p yi,p = fix_inni,p yi,p = fix_t.a.i,p
entr. other entr. other entr. other entr. other
α1 -5.19** -1.42 5.04 1.07 -5.13** -0.26 2.69 -0.19
(-2.1) (-0.9) (1.5) (0.6) (-2.3) (-0.1) (1.4) (-0.1)
α2 0.71 0.74 0.51 0.52** 0.26 0.35 0.15 0.03
(1.5) (2.5) (1.2) (2.0) (0.6) (1.4) (0.4) (0.1)
α3 -0.45 0.20 -0.35 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.27 -0.33
(-0.9) (0.7) (-1.0) (0.5) (0.2) (1.0) (0.8) (-1.3)
α4 -1.04 0.40 0.85 -0.50 0.37 0.63 -0.07 -0.38
(-1.3) (0.8) (1.0) (-1.1) (0.4) (1.3) (-0.1) (-0.9)
α5 1.00 -0.67 -2.92 -1.60 3.74 3.86** -0.64 -1.86
(0.3) (-0.4) (-1.1) (-0.9) (1.3) (2.1) (-0.3) (-1.2)
α6 0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.21 0.40** 0.08 -0.26 -0.15
(0.6) (-0.2) (0.6) (1.4) (2.2) (0.7) (-1.4) (-1.3)
α7 0.025 0.063** -0.12* -0.09*** 0.12** 0.03 -0.17 -0.02
(0.5) (2.1) (-1.7) (-3.5) (2.3) (1.1) (-3.2) (-0.6)
α8 -.0001 -.001** .002 .001*** -.002 -.0005 .003 .0003
(-0.1) (-2.3) (1.7) (4.0) (-2.0) (-1.2) (3.1) (0.7)
n.obs 3507 7703 3601 7753 3591 7759 3620 7759
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.080 0.048 0.040 0.044 0.033 0.047 0.03
Estimate of α1 for ﬁrms selected according to diversiﬁcation and ﬁnancing constraints
diversi,p ≤ 0.5 -7.06** -2.10 3.73 1.96 -4.08* -2.18 -1.90 0.39
(-2.1) (-1.2) (1.1) (0.9) (-1.7) (-1.0) (-0.8) (0.25)
diversi,p > 0.5 -3.50 -0.06 10.05 -1.64 -5.54 3.27 9.02*** -1.00
(-0.83) (-0.0) (1.5) (-0.6) (-1.5) (1.2) (2.8) (-0.4)
diversi,p ≤ 0.5 -14.01*** -4.09** 3.06 2.81 -5.12 -3.24 -1.05 1.41
and no constrained (-3.2) (-2.2) (1.0) (1.1) (-1.5) (-1.4) (-0.3) (0.8)
diversi,p > 0.5 1.44 3.06 10.3 -2.20 -1.46 4.47 6.97* -2.05
and no constrained (0.3) (0.9) (1.5) (-0.7) (-0.4) (1.6) (1.8) (-0.8)
All regressions are estimated with a maximum likelihood Probit estimator. I use a Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
the variance to correct for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the 3 digit sector level. *Signiﬁcant at the
90% conﬁdence level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. diversi,p
is the average of the ratio between the net ﬁnancial assets and total assets for ﬁrm i in survey p. sdroa_1i,s :
standard deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the
most recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm i exports part of its production outside
Italy, and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1 (44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the
order placed by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares
ﬁnancing constraints (14%), and zero otherwise. avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector
s in the most recent year of the survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of the ﬁrm (relative
to the year of the survey) in years. d
2digits
i,p is a series of two digit sector dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of
dummy variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
59Table XV: The relationship between risk and innovation. Exogenous risk measure. Fixed
eﬀects at the three digits level and instrumental variable estimation
Regression: yi,p = α0 + α1sdroa_1s,p + α2exports,p + α3supplys,p + α4constraineds,p




yi,p = r&d_inni,p yi,p = r&d_t.ai,p yi,p = fix_inni,p yi,p = fix_t.a.i,p
Estimate of α1 for ﬁrms selected according to diversiﬁcation and ﬁnancing constraints
entrep. other entrep. other entrep. other entrep. other
All ﬁrms -8.01 -3.50 4.19 0.36 -11.79 -5.04 6.73 7.44
(-1.3) (-0.6) (0.6) (0.1) (-1.47) (-0.8) (0.8) (1.1)
F test (p-value) 7.2(.00) 10.5(.00) 7.2(.00) 10.5(.00) 7.2(.00) 10.5(.00) 7.2(.00) 10.5(.00)
prob. of the J test 0.600 0.812 0.148 0.686 0.601 0.457 0.381 0.363
diversi,p ≤ 0.5 -11.63* -13.33* 3.25 8.16 -14.94* -11.45 7.14 12.05
(-1.6) (-1.7) (0.5) (1.0) (-1.7) (-1.3) (0.8) (1.4)
F test (p-value) 6.7(.00) 6.3(.00) 6.7(.00) 6.3(.00) 6.7(.00) 6.3(.00) 6.7(.00) 6.3(.00)
prob. of the J test 0.752 0.965 0.880 0.874 0.215 0.830 0.225 0.643
diversi,p > 0.31 1.92 4.69 7.40 -2.63 -4.10 0.36 7.83 3.40
(0.2) (0.8) (0.8) (-0.4) (-0.4) (0.1) (0.7) (0.5)
F test (p-value) 3.5(.01) 8.6(.00) 3.5(.00) 8.6(.00) 3.5(.01) 8.6(.00) 3.5(.01) 8.6(.00)
prob. of the J test 0.260 0.523 (0.041) 0.473 0.563 0.927 0.159 0.678
diversi,p ≤ 0.5 -12.31* -8.26 -2.59 7.73 -19.55** -4.89 11.53 7.91
constrained excluded (-1.7) (-1.1) (-0.3) (0.9) (-2.0) (-0.6) (1.2) (0.9)
F test (p-value) 5.9(.00) 5.7(.00) 5.9(.00) 5.7(.00) 5.9(.00) 5.7(.00) 5.9(.00) 5.7(.00)
prob. of the J test 0.640 0.845 0.959 0.667 0.241 0.864 0.235 0.823
diversi,p > 0.31 3.16 8.02 4.25 2.29 -4.45 3.49 6.65 1.60
constrained excluded (0.4) (1.2) (0.5) (-0.3) (-0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.2)
F test (p-value) 3.0(.02) 6.8(.00) 3.02(.02) 6.8(.00) 3.0(.02) 6.8(.00) 3.0(.00) 6.8(.00)
prob. of the J test 0.368 0.362 0.066 0.674 0.829 0.959 0.366 0.954
All regressions are estimated with a two-step feasible GMM estimator. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity. The variable sdroa_1s,p is instrumented using sdroa_1s,p−1,avgroa_1s,p−1,s d _outputs,p
and sd_outputs,p−1. The F −statistic refers to the signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments calculated in the ﬁrst
stage. The p-value of the Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions is also reported. diversi,p is the average of
the ratio between the net ﬁnancial assets and total assets for ﬁrm i in survey p. *Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence
level; **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; *** signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. sdroa_1i,s : standard
deviation of the cross section of the gross income/assets ratio for the ﬁrms in the three digit sector s in the most
recent years of each survey. exporti,p : equal to 1 (69% of total) if ﬁrm i exports part of its production outside Italy,
and is equal to 0 otherwise. supplyi,p : equal to 1 (44%) if ﬁrm i produces 100% of its output based on the order
placed by downstream ﬁrms. and equal to zero otherwise. constrainedi,p : equal to one if the ﬁrm declares ﬁnancing
constraints (14%), and zero otherwise. avgroa_1i,s : cross sectional mean of the return on assets for sector s in the
most recent year of the survey. sizei,p : number of employees of ﬁrm i. agei,p : age of the ﬁrm (relative to the year
of the survey) in years. d
3digits
i,p is a series of three digit sector dummy variables, and d
survey
i,p is a series of dummy
variables that are equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is surveyed in Survey p, and equal to zero otherwise.
60